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From State Street Bank to CLS Bank
and Back: Reforming Software
Patents to Promote Innovation
ABSTRACT
For the past several decades, the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit have struggled to determine if, and under what circumstances,
software is patentable. Once again, the Federal Circuit had an
opportunity to provide clarity when it granted en banc review in CLS
Bank. The resulting opinion contained a cursory per curiam decision
and numerous concurrences and dissents, showing that the question is
far from answered. Ultimately, the struggle over software patentability
is not itself the problem, but a symptom of other problems in the patent
system. Specifically, other substantive requirements of patentability
are not weeding out overly broad patents because the person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) of software is assumed to be
extremely skilled. Where PHOSITAs are highly skilled, the US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) allows broad claims based on
minimal disclosure. By repairing the conception of the PHOSITA in
the courts, the USPTO can issue narrower, less-restrictive patents.
Once claim scope is adequately limited and more thorough disclosure
required, the courts can return the patentability analysis to the
permissive one in State Street Bank, ensuring public access to the
invention and removing the cloud of suspicion that currently hangs
over software patents.
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"What's the shortest way to travel from Rotterdam to
Groningen?"'  That simple question, posed to the young Dutch
computer scientist Edsger Dijkstra, sparked the invention of a simple
algorithm to find the shortest path between two points on a map.
2
Dijkstra invented the algorithm that now bears his name in 1956 to
demonstrate the capabilities of the then-nascent field of digital
computing. 3 Today, Djikstra's algorithm provides the foundation of
software that generates driving directions and routes information
around the Internet. 4 Thousands of algorithms like it surround users
every day, returning Internet search results, recommending
purchases, and selecting songs based on personal music preferences.
5
Apart from Internet technologies, these algorithms time traffic lights,
automate stock trading, and route phone calls. 6  All of these
technologies embody innovative algorithms and apply them in our
everyday lives.
Curiously, despite the omnipresence of algorithm-driven
technology, it is unclear whether, or in what circumstances, US law
1. Philip L. Frana & Thomas J. Misa, An Interview with Edsger W. Dijkstra,
COMMITT1EE ACM, Aug. 2010, at 41, 42-43, available at http://dl.acm.orglcitation.cfm?doid=
1787234.1787249.
2. See id.
3. See E.W. Dijkstra, A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs, 1
NUMERISCHE MATHEMATIK 269, 269-71 (1959).
4. Peter W. Eklund et al., A Dynamic Multi-source Dijkstra's Algorithm for Vehicle
Routing, IEEE AUSTL. & N.Z. CONF. ON INTELLIGENT INFO. SYS. 329-33 (1996); J. Moy, OSPF
Version 2: Network Working Group Request for Comments 2328, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE, at 160-66 (Apr. 1998), http://tools.ietf.orglhtml/rfc2328 (describing implementation of
Dijkstra's Algorithm as part of the "Open Shortest Path First" standard link-state routing
protocol).
5. See Joseph A. Konstan & John Riedl, Deconstructing Recommender Systems, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Sept. 24, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.orglcomputing/software/
deconstructing-recommender-systems; Jonathan Strickland, Why Is the Google Algorithm So
Important?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Jan. 11, 2008), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/google-
algorithm.htm; Rob Walker, The Song Decoders, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.n ytimes.coml2009llO/18/magazine/18Pandora-t.html.
6. See, e.g., GSM Tech. Specification Digital Cellular Telecommunications System
(Phase 2+); Handover Procedures, ETSI 16 (Aug. 1997), http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi-gts/03/
0309/05.01.00_60/gsmts 0309v050100p.pdf; NYSE Arca Equities Order Processing, NYSE ARCA,
http://usequities.nyx.com/markets/nyse-arca-equitieslorder-processing (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
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permits patents on those algorithms. 7  Specifically, controversy
surrounds whether algorithms fall within the allowable categories of
patentable subject matter.8 Congress intended the patent laws to
permit patents on "'anything under the sun that is made by man."'9
Despite this seemingly unlimited scope, courts have subsequently
excluded from the universe of inventions those that are merely "laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."10 Over the past
forty years, the Supreme Court and the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have struggled to determine whether software
algorithms are "abstract ideas."11  Even the most recent Supreme
Court decision to address the issue merely rejected the Federal
Circuit's proposed rule and failed to provide any guidance on what an
appropriate rule should be.
12
A related issue arises when the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) does issue software patents. 13 Those patents contain
broad claims, yet disclose little about how the patented technology
works. 14 Thus, patentees often gain powerful patent monopolies while
providing the public with little useful knowledge about how those
patented inventions work.1 5 As a result, the federal government is
issuing patents, but the "general store of knowledge" is not growing.
16
7. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life after Bilski, 63 STAN L. REV. 1315, 1317-18
(2011) ("The patentability of software ... has a long and tortured history.").
8. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010) (holding that a software
system for hedging risk of commodity prices was not patent eligible); Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a
software system for managing life insurance policies is not patent eligible); CLS Bank Int'l v.
Alice Corp. Pty. (CLS Bank I), 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that a software system
for settlement of financial obligations was not patent eligible), vacated, 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); cf., e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that a software system for delivering advertising to users is patent eligible), vacated sub
nom. Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (mem.).
9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
10. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-20 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75
(1853)).
11. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
12. See id.
13. See infra Part I.A.1.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the
"general store of knowledge" is so important that the Federal government is willing to pay for it
with the grant of a monopoly); Table 4.7: Judicial Facts and Figures 2010, UNITED STATES
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
At its most basic level, the quid pro quo of the patent system-
monopoly in exchange for disclosure-has broken down. 17
The problem is not that software presents a new or
insurmountable challenge to the patent system.'8 Rather the patent
system itself has failed to properly adjust to the field of software
programming in the same way it has adjusted to other new fields of
science. 19 This Note argues that the patentable subject matter
controversy is not itself the problem, but is instead a symptom caused
by inadequate enforcement of disclosure requirements. 20 Thus, by
repairing what is broken about the rules governing disclosure, the
USPTO will only grant software patents that adequately disclose
inventions and have narrower claims.2' Those claims will neither
restrain innovation nor stifle disclosure. 22 Instead, those documents
will be meaningful contributions to the public store of knowledge,
providing invaluable technical information to future innovators. 23
Best of all, the patentable subject matter controversy can be put to
rest at last.
24
This Note examines the current controversy over patentable
subject matter and charts a course back to reasonable grants of patent
protection for software. Part I explores the unique challenges that
software poses to the patent system. Part II analyzes the current
state of the controversy in the Federal Circuit as seen in the recent
case, CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp..25 Part III recommends a
solution that should place software patentability on a surer footing by
repairing the problems with enablement and claim construction that
have contributed to the current confusion, and liberalizing the
patentable subject matter test, so it does not serve as a trap for the
unwary.
2010.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (showing a rise in patent cases filed from 1,165 in 1990 to
3,220 in 2010).
17. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) ("In
consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is
granted.").
18. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding that a man-
made organism is patentable, thus extending patent protection to the then nascent field of
biotechnology).
19. See id.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.B.3.
22. See infra Part I.B.2.
23. See infra Part I.B.2.
24. See infra Part III.A..
25. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. (CLS Bank I1), 717 F.3d 1269, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
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I. PATENT DOCTRINES AND SOFTWARE CHALLENGES
Controversy has surrounded software's patentability since the
beginning of the digital era. 26 In Gottschalk v. Benson, the first case to
address software patentability, the Supreme Court excluded software
completely from the patent system.27 Years later, the Court allowed
software patents in Diamond v. Diehr, but only for software combined
with a machine that produced a physical result.28 The Federal Circuit
finally broadly permitted software patents in the State Street Bank
decision, which allowed patents on machines and processes that
produced a numerical, rather than physical, result. 29 A few years
later, the Supreme Court reined in that doctrine in Bilski v. Kappos.30
This section describes the larger framework of the controversy by
(1) discussing the foundational ideas and goals of the patent system, 31
(2) outlining the particular challenges that software presents to the
patent system, 32 and (3) discussing the genesis of the patentable
subject matter controversy in the courts through the historic telegraph
case, O'Reilly v. Morse.
33
A. First Principles of Patent Law
Fundamentally, the US patent system is an outgrowth of the
Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the US Constitution, which
empowers Congress "[t]o promote the [p]rogress ... [of] useful [a]rts,
by securing for limited [t]imes to . . . [ijnventors the exclusive [r]ight
to their ... [d]iscoveries." 34 Scholars generally recognize that the
patent system must provide two incentives: (1) an incentive to invent
and (2) an incentive to disclose. 35 The incentive-to-invent rationale
recognizes that inventors will have to expend resources to invent new
26. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
27. See id.
28. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
29. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
30. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1025-30 (1989); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology,
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time." (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989))).
429
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products. 36 Once invented, competitors may free ride and produce the
invented product at a lower cost without investing in expensive
research.37 If patent holders are unable to artificially inflate prices,
prospective inventors may be unwilling to fund research in the pursuit
of new inventions.
38
The incentive-to-disclose rationale addresses the problem that
trade secret protection poses to the progress of science. 39 When
inventors create new devices, they may not reveal how the invention
works, and instead conceal its inner workings as a trade secret. 40 For
the inventor, this gives a de-facto monopoly that lasts until other
innovators are able to reverse engineer or independently develop the
same technology.41  If these efforts are successful, the inventor's
monopoly ends.42  If these efforts fail, inventors can keep their
inventions secret and potentially exploit them indefinitely. 43 In either
case, knowledge of how the invention works will not enter the public
domain; instead, only the company willing to pay to reverse engineer
will obtain that knowledge. 44 The incentive to disclose is intended to
prevent costly duplicative research.45 After receiving a patent, the
patentee knows that his exclusive right to an invention is secure for a
term of years. 46 In exchange, the inventor grants to the public a
disclosure of how the invention works, thus eliminating the need for
duplicative research. 47
To ensure the public actually receives sufficient information to
prevent that duplicative research, US law requires inventors to
36. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1024-28.
37. See id. at 1024-25.
38. See id. at 1025-26.
39. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 ("[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to
bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure."); Cont'l Paper
Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) ("and it was further said in [Am. Bell Tel.
Co.] that the inventor could have kept his discovery to himself; but, to induce a disclosure of it,
Congress has . . . guaranteed to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time" (citing United
States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 249 (1897))); Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1028-30.
40. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-91 (1974) (discussing the
alternatives of patents and trade secrets).





45. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1028-30.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (providing that patents expire twenty years from filing).
This assumes that the patent will not be subsequently found invalid by a reviewing court, or in a
reexamination. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (providing defenses of invalidity during litigation);
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971) (providing for
preclusive effects of a finding of invalidity).
47. See Eisenberg, supra note 35 at 1028-30.
[Vol. 16:2:425
2014] FROM STATE STREET BANK TO CLS BANK AND BACK 431
describe their inventions with sufficient detail to enable a person
having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to make or use the
patented invention.48 This requirement is known as "enablement" and
is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).49 A "commensurability" requirement
compels inventors to match the scope of the disclosure with the scope
of the claims. 50 That is, an enabling patent specification must disclose
enough information for the PHOSITA to practice the entire scope of
the invention as described in the claims.
51
Disclosure is only one of many requirements necessary to
obtain a patent.52 First, the invention must fall into one of the
categories of patentable subject matter and be useful. 53 Second, the
invention must be novel. 54 Third, the claimed invention must not be
obvious to a PHOSITA in light of technology already known (i.e., prior
art).55 Finally, the applicant must meet several specific disclosure
requirements: the application must comply with the written
description requirement, be enabled (as discussed above), and disclose
the best mode of practicing the invention.
56
One of the threads that weave these requirements together is
the concept of the PHOSITA. 57 The PHOSITA appears in many
contexts, but three are particularly important as applied to software:
claim construction,58 enablement, 59 and non-obviousness.6 0 Though
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); MPEP § 2164 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Oct. 2012).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
50. Id.
51. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); MPEP § 2164.08 (8th ed.
Rev. 9, Oct. 2012).
52. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2012) (describing various requirements to
be met before obtaining a patent).
53. See id. § 101.
54. See id. §§ 101-102.
55. See id. § 103.
56. See id. § 112.
57. See id. § 103 (codifying the PHOSITA concept); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
248, 267 (1851) (using the phrase "ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business" as the
standard for non-obviousness).
58. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(explaining that the meaning of claim terms "is the meaning that the term would have to a
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention" (citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Home Diagnostics, Inc. v.
LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v.
Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PC Connector Solutions LLC v.
SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d
1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
59. See Auto Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) ("[T]he 'enablement requirement is satisfied when one skilled in the art, after reading
the specification, could practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation."' (quoting
AK Steel v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
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the level of skill of a PHOSITA is the same, there are slight variations
in how creative the PHOSITA may be, as well as how much of the
prior art a PHOSITA knows.6 1 The Federal Circuit has outlined a
broad framework for determining the relevant level of skill for the
PHOSITA, but there is no unified standard dictating precisely when in
the course of litigation a court should determine that level of skill.
62
The PHOSITA also serves another key role in the US patent system
by adapting each of the various requirements to different technology
fields.63 It is for this reason that the PHOSITA is a key concept for
those attempting to understand the many problems unique to software
patents.
64
B. The Problem of Software
Software presents several challenges to many of the
fundamental presuppositions of patent law.6 5 First, it belongs to the
class of inventions that are not particularly susceptible to reverse
engineering, thus allowing for strong trade secret protection that
weakens the incentives to seek patent protection.6 6 Second, even
issued software patents do not effectively disclose how the claimed
software actually functions. 67 In a string of cases, the Federal Circuit
has defined the software PHOSITA to be someone of extraordinary
skill, thus permitting applicants to obtain a patent in exchange for
minimal disclosure. 6 Third, as a result of these two problems, the
60. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) ("Often, it will be
necessary for a court to look to[, among other things,] the background knowledge possessed by a
person having ordinary skill in the art ... in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.").
61. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1187-90 (2002).
62. See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Currently, the standard for determining the relevant level of skill of a PHOSITA is a six-factor
test that includes: "(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in
the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made;
(5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of active workers in the field."'
(quoting Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
63. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1185-89.
64. See infra Part I.B.
65. See infra Parts I.B.1-3.
66. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29-37 (2001).
67. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1162-63; infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
68. See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (saying that the creation of
software is a "mere clerical" task for a skilled programmer); Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at
1162-63.
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USPTO is unable to effectively examine future software-patent
applications.6 9 Effective examination of patents requires that the
examiners know the general state of the art so they can determine
whether patents are new and non-obvious.7 0 Most of this knowledge
comes from prior patents and published patent applications. 71 Thus,
when the USPTO issues poorly enabled patents, it creates a feedback
loop, preventing the office from effectively examining future
applications.72
1. Reverse Engineering
The USPTO is hardly alone in struggling to understand the
landscape of modern software development. 73  For this reason,
scholars have spilled considerable ink defending the right of non-
patentees to reverse engineer software to uncover its functionality.
7 4
Reverse engineering is the least costly way for competitors to unlock
the secrets of patented software and understand the functionality that
a patent specification may only suggest.75 But reverse engineering
software is fraught with both legal and technical problems. 76
To begin, some background on the technical details of software
may be helpful. Software exists in two basic forms: source code and
object code.77 The source code consists of human-readable text that
69. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972).
70. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (explaining that the "most effective patent
examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the [USPTO] is aware of
and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability").
71. See MPEP § 904.02 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Oct. 2012) (discussing common search areas for
patent examiners).
72. See id. (explaining sources for examiner's citations of prior art).
73. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 18-19.
74. See, e.g., Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 29-37 (proposing numerous legal
reforms to ensure the continued legality of software reverse engineering); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock
Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1096-97 (1995) (proposing various reforms to allow
continued reverse engineering of software); Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1017 (arguing for an
expanded experimental use right to ensure access to patentable inventions); Tonya M. Evans,
Reverse Engineering IP, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 61, 99-101 (2013) (arguing for a specific
enumerated reverse engineering right); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1057-58 (1997) (characterizing reverse
engineering of software as a positive externality); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The
Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1607-30 (2002) (outlining the
economic benefits of allowing reverse engineering of software).
75. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 18-19.
76. See Betsy E. Bayha, Reverse Engineering of Computer Software in the United States,
the European Union, and Japan, C 137 ALI-ABA 175, 177 (1995).
77. See Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 197 (1992).
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explains the functionality of the software. 78 To run the code, a
compiler must convert the source code to create computer-readable
object code. 79  That process strips away commentary and other
distinguishing features of the source code that are critical for human
programmers and irrelevant to the computers that run the object
code.80 Usually programmers distribute only the object code while
preserving the source code as a trade secret.81 This renders the
original source code unavailable in practice, leaving competitors with
only the object code to analyze.
8 2
Object code can be decompiled back into a form of source code;
however, that decompiled code lacks the developers' commentary and
does not reflect the structure of the original source code.83  For
example, decompilation usually cannot even reveal which high-level
programming language (like C++, Objective-C, or C#) the original
programmer used when authoring the source code.8 4 Thus, while the
decompiled result may be useful, it is probably nothing like the
original source code.8 5 Even so, any uncovering of functionality still
requires that the prospective reverse engineer have access to the
original object code in some way.8 6
The recent trend towards "cloud-based" computing may put a
large percentage of code completely out of reach.8 7 Cloud computing is
a computing model that allows "ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access" to services, platforms, and network infrastructures.8 8




81. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering The Business of Innovation: The Untold
Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 445, 451 (2012).
82. See Litman, supra note 77, at 197.
83. See Teodoro Cipresso & Mark Stamp, Software Reverse Engineering, in HANDBOOK
OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY 659-96, 664 (Peter P. Stavroulakis & Mark
Stamp, eds., 2010); Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating Legal
Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331, 342 (1992).
84. See Cipresso & Stamp, supra note 83, at 664.
85. See id. (quoting Boomerang Decompiler, BOOMERANG, http:/fboomerang.
sourceforge.net (last visited Oct. 3, 2013)). Note also that developer comments are ignored by the
compiler, so any developer commentary is irreversibly destroyed by compilation. See Litman,
supra note 77, at 197.
86. See Cipresso & Stamp, supra note 83, at 664 (noting that the first step is
decompiling object code, so thus the object code must be accessible for decompliation).
87. Horacio E. Gutierrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of Intellectual
Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 589, 602-04 (2011).
88. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING (SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145) 2
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
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networks.8 9 Examples of these sorts of cloud-computing applications
include Google Search, Facebook, and web-based email applications. 90
A prospective reverse engineer without access to every computer
involved in the application will likely not be able to adequately
observe the system's functionality, thus making it nearly impossible to
reverse engineer the software. 91 This effectively eliminates reverse
engineering as a feasible method of uncovering software functionality
from a wide- and fast-growing group of software technologies.
92
Reverse engineering software also faces numerous legal
hurdles. Copyright law, patent law, state trade secret law, and
contract law all erect barriers to reverse engineering. 93 For example,
software developers often copyright both the object code and the
source code. 94 Earlier types of copyrighted works (for example, books
and visual art) are not generally targets of reverse engineering, so
there was originally some concern that reverse engineering, which
often involves making intermediate copies, could constitute copyright
infringement. 95 The Ninth Circuit put those fears to rest in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., holding that the intermediate
copying was a form of fair use.96 This victory, however, may be short-
lived in light of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) anti-
circumvention provisions. 97 The DMCA codifies the holding in Sega,
but it only permits software to be reverse engineered "for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program
that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently
created computer program."98  Because "interoperability" is the only
permitted purpose of reverse engineering, this implies that the DMCA
89. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 404 (2011).
90. Id. at 405.
91. Id.; see Gutierrez, supra note 87, at 603.
92. See Christopher Soghoian, Caught In The Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, And
Government Back Doors In The Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359 (2010); CSA &
ISACA, CLOUD COMPUTING MARKET MATURITY STUDY RESULTS 1, available at
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/collaborate/isaca/2012 -Cloud-Computing-
Market-Maturity-Study-Results.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) ("Cloud computing . .. is at the
point of advancing from infancy to growth and is reaching a level of maturity at which
enterprises can benefit greatly by adopting cloud infrastructure, platform or software service
offerings.").
93. See Cohen, supra note 66, at 1095.
94. See Litman, supra note 77, at 200.
95. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. See id. This holding has been consistently followed in similar cases. See, e.g., Sony
Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
97. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
98. Id. § 1201(0(1).
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excludes reverse engineering in order to understand how a program
works or creates a competing program.99
A separate provision of the DMCA specifically outlaws devices
that are "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner."100  This, read
literally, would almost certainly prohibit any form of software
intended to aid in the decompliation process or otherwise assist in
reverse engineering software.10 1  For these reasons, the § 112
disclosure requirements of patent law, along with the incentive to
disclose, may be the only means by which to determine with any
clarity how software operates. 10 2 Patent law therefore presents a
unique opportunity to mandate disclosing software's inner
workings.
1 0 3
2. The Software PHOSITA
The definition of a software PHOSITA as a person of
extraordinary skill unfortunately leads to minimal disclosure of how
software inventions work, upsetting the standard balance between
protection and disclosure.104 For example, in Northern Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., the Federal Circuit described a programming
language as "simply a highly structured language" and that the
"conversion of a complete thought ... into a language a machine
understands is necessarily a mere clerical function to a skilled
programmer." 10 5 As mentioned before, the PHOSITA plays a critical
role in tailoring the patent statutes to specific industries.10 6 In some
industries, once the Federal Circuit determines the level of skill of the
PHOSITA in a particular industry, that level of skill tends to stick.107
Part of this is a result of the Markman-Cybor
claim-construction regime that allows the Federal Circuit to review
99. See id.
100. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A).
101. See Craig Zieminski, Game Over for Reverse Engineering?: How the DCMA and
Contracts Have Affected Innovation, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 289, 309 (2008).
102. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
103. See id.
104. See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
105. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 n.6 (C.C.P.A.
1980)).
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (codifying the "person having ordinary skill in the art"
standard); Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1185-86.
107. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1196.
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claim constructions de novo.108 In Markman v. Westview Instruments,
the Supreme Court held that claim construction was a question of law
for a judge.10 9 In Cybor v. FAS Technologies, the Federal Circuit held
that trial court claim constructions were entitled to no deference and
reviewable de novo. 110  These precedents rely on the idea that
construing the words of a legal document is a task that the court is
uniquely suited to, such as in contract law. 1 A side effect of granting
de novo review is that PHOSITA skill levels in prior cases tend to
influence later cases, even though the PHOSITA's level of skill is an
underlying question of fact.
112
The Markman-Cybor regime is a controversial one that the
Federal Circuit has revisited on two occasions. 113  First, in its
landmark Phillips v. AWH decision, the Federal Circuit included the
issue in its order granting rehearing en banc, but refused to address
it.114 The Federal Circuit returned to the issue in Lighting Ballast
Control LLC v. Phillips Electric, ultimately reaffirming the
Markman-Cybor regime. 115 In Lighting Ballast, the district court
issued a Markman order construing the term "voltage source
means."116 The patentee argued that "voltage source means" would be
understood by a PHOSITA to mean a rectifier, which is the only type
of device that could fulfill the other requirements of the claim.11 7 In
the trial court, the patentee presented expert testimony and other
extrinsic evidence to show that this was the correct construction.
118
108. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996); Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
109 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
110. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
il1. Id. at 978 ("It has long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of
American law that the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court.") (internal
quotes omitted) (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)).
112. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378 (referrring to claim construction as a "mongrel practice"
where terms of art are construed following the receipt of evidence).
113. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014, 2014
WL 667499, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
114. In Phillips v. AWH, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review to six questions, the
last of which was whether the Federal Circuit should revise Cybor. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2005). When the Phillips opinion was handed down, the Federal Circuit refused to discuss Cybor,
leading to a heated dissent by Judge Mayer and Newman, blasting the court for "rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic" by not overturning Cybor. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1334-35.
115. Lighting Ballast, 2014 WL 667499, at *1.
116. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 Fed. Appx.
986, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2013), affirmed, 2014 WL 667499, at *1.
117. See id. at 991 ("Lighting Ballast relies on expert testimony to support its argument
that 'voltage source means' implies structure .....
118. Id.
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The original panel reversed without the benefit of hearing that
testimony, however, and held the claim invalid as indefinite. 119 When
the Federal Circuit took the case en banc, it reaffirmed the
Markman-Cybor framework, meaning that the software PHOSITA
will likely continue to have extraordinary skill.120
This attitude likely explains the current problems with
software patents. 121 Defining a PHOSITA as one with an extremely
high level of skill effectively eviscerates the enablement requirements
under § 112.122 In one of the most extreme examples, In re Dossel, the
Federal Circuit found that a software patent that neither used the
word "computer" nor contained any computer code at all satisfied the
enablement requirement of § 1 12.123 As a result, software patents that
do issue tend to have extraordinarily broad claims and little
meaningful disclosure, if any. 24
The enablement requirement differs for varying technological
fields, based on the predictability of the art. 125 In some fields, lower
standards of enablement make sense.1 26 Among "predictable" fields of
invention, like mechanical devices, the specification only needs to
disclose a few possible ways of practicing the invention, whereas in
"unpredictable" fields, like biotech and pharmaceuticals, the
specification must include in-depth disclosure of every possible means
of practicing the invention. 127 Software, however, appears to be the
only field that exists outside this spectrum; a patent can meet the
enablement requirement without disclosing even a single
embodiment.128 In re Dossel demonstrates that the patent system's
basic quid pro quo-the grant of a monopoly to the inventor in
exchange for disclosure to the public-has completely broken down. 12
9
119. Id. at 992.
120. See id. at 1168.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1196.
123. See In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
124. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223-24, 3231 (2010) (explaining that
the claims at issue were so broad that they did not require a computer, and constitute a patent
on the concept of hedging).
125. See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 127, 136-39 (2008).
126. See id.
127. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1196; Seymore, supra note 125, at 136-39.
128. In re Dossel, 115 F.3d at 946-47.
129. See id.
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3. Examination Issues
In 1965, a presidential commission on the patent system
concluded that the USPTO was unable to examine applications for
software patents because it had no classification system or sufficient
prior-art files with which to properly examine the applications.1 30
Since then, little has changed. 31 The lack of sufficient prior-art
databases for the purposes of examining software patents is a major
driver of poor patent quality. 13 2 This problem is not entirely the
USPTO's fault. 133 Unlike advances in fields such as biotechnology,
software improvements rarely appear in peer-reviewed journals,
conference presentations, or other media that traditionally establishes
prior art in other fields. 134 There are several professional associations
that publish scholarly materials, primarily the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM)135 and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE).136 But the nature of the software
industry dictates that business, and not academia, drives
innovation. 137  Generally, businesses simply incorporate their
innovations into products without documentation or only describe
them in user manuals that are frequently unavailable to examiners.138
While these materials would certainly be useful, the most effective
form of prior art for software patents is probably original source code
with the original developer comments. 139
That source code, however, is almost never available for two
reasons. 140  First, the owners of the source code, containing the
130. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS 13 (1966), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.eduthistorical/9.
131. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 64, at 12-13.
132. See Cohen, supra note 74, at 1177-80; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 12-13.
133. See Cohen, supra note 74, at 1177-80.; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 42.
134. See Cohen, supra note 74, at 1177-78; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 42.
135. See Journals & Magazines, ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, available at
http://www.acm.org/publications/journals (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
136. See Publish a Paper with IEEE, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/publications-standards/
publications/authors/paper.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
137. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66, at 42.
138. Cohen, supra note 74, at 1177-78.
139. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1166 n.46 ("Professor Randall Davis of MIT
summed it up at the National Research Counsel in 1990: 'There is almost no way to visualize
software. Sure, we have flow charts, we have data-flow diagrams, we have control flow diagrams,
and everybody knows how basically useless those are."' (quoting Thomas P. Burke, Note,
Software Patent Protection: Debugging the Current System, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1158-
60 (1994))).
140. See infra notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
developer's commentary on the software's functionality, protect the
code as a trade secret.141 In some cases, independent open-source
developers have disseminated source code more widely in the interest
of making code more accessible to third parties. 142 While open-source
code may be available online, and thus to patent examiners, the
innovative content of open-source code often lags far behind its
commercial competitors.
143
Second, even though copyright registration could potentially
offer an avenue for disclosure, the Copyright Office currently does not
require developers to provide a complete copy of their code.1 44 Most
software developers do file copyright registrations, which ordinarily
require that the registrant deposit copies of the material with the
Copyright Office. 145 Unfortunately, the Copyright Office does not
require the deposit of a complete copy, but only requires an excerpt of
the source code. 46 While the Copyright Office could require the
deposit of a complete copy, the size of many software programs would
make storage cost prohibitive, as many commercial software packages
contain millions of lines of code. 47 Further, to zealously guard their
code, companies could forgo copyright registration and only register
before they enforce their copyrights against possible infringers. 148
Preventing such a workaround would be no small task, as the Berne
Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the
141. See Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual Property Law? The Case
Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 10 (2001).
142. See Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 563, 594-96 (2004).
143. For example, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption technology, which enables
servers and web browsers to communicate securely, was developed by Netscape in 1996. See A.
Freier et al., The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE (August 2011), http://www.rfc-base.org/txtrfc-6101.txt. However, the first open-source
alternative, OpenSSL, was not available until the end of 1998. Tarballs, OPENSSL (Oct. 3, 2013,
8:57 PM), http://www.openssl.org/source/ (showing a timestamp of the first version in December
of 1998).
144. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (2012).
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2012) ("[Tjhe owner of copyright... shall deposit, within three
months after the date of such publication.., two complete copies of the best edition .... ").
146. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (2012) (requiring only "identifying" portions of the
program to be deposited, including either the first and last twenty-five pages of code, or, if the
source code is held as a trade secret, only the "page or equivalent unit containing the copyright
notice" plus several pages with trade secret materials blocked out).
147. For example, a complete copy of Windows XP contains 35 million lines of code, not
including developer comments. Steve Lohr & John Markoff, Windows So Slow, but Why?, N.Y.
TIMES (March 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/technology/27soft.html.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating that copyright exists once a work of
authorship is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" and thus does not require
registration).
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United States from conditioning protection on registration. 149
Therefore, patent law remains in the best position to provide for public
disclosure of software inventions.
150
C. The Genesis of Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine
For patent law to serve that purpose, software must first be
patentable. Whether software is patentable is at least nominally an
issue of construing 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter ... may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."
15 1
Notwithstanding one minor alteration, the language of this
statute has remained fundamentally unchanged since the Patent Act
of 1793.152 Congress has suggested that the four statutory
categories-processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of
matter-encompass "anything under the sun that is made by man."
153
Consistent with this limitation, courts have read into the statute three
major exceptions: "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas."154  The Supreme Court has typically explained that these
exclusions are intended to prevent patents that would "preempt" too
much follow-on innovation. 155 Simply put, patents for inventions in
these excluded categories would not serve the constitutional aim of
encouraging innovation but would instead prevent the use of
discoveries that are the "basic tools of scientific and technological
work."1
56
Of the three exclusions from patentable subject matter, patents
on software often conflict with the abstract-idea exception. 157 Method
149. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, July
14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 223.
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
152. The Patent Act of 1793 included "art" rather than "process." The language was
amended in the Patent Act of 1952. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 978 (2008) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), affd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2009).
153. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R.
REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
154. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-20 (1854);
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1853)).
155. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
156. See id.
157. See generally Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to
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claims that only specify an algorithm itself fall plainly within the
abstract-idea exception, particularly within the well-defined category
of mathematical algorithms. 158  Claims that attempt to capture
software algorithms as tied to a "general-purpose computer" or as a
"software product" have also run into difficulty because courts do not
view those limitations as meaningful. 159 In fact, courts often focus
their § 101 analysis on the method claim, and, after finding it directed
towards non-statutory subject matter, invalidate the remaining media
and system claims as a matter of course.1 60 Courts have wrestled with
the question of software for nearly forty years, yet there is still no
clear guidance to patent practitioners as to whether or when software
is patent eligible.1
61
The first case to squarely address software was Gottschalk v.
Benson, a case in which the Supreme Court held that a software
method for converting binary numbers was not patent eligible.1 62
Since the decision to exclude software from patent protection in
Benson, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have alternated
between two general approaches to the patent eligibility of software.
1 63
The first approach is exemplified in the classic Benson-Flook-Diehr
trilogy that explored whether software had to be tied to a machine or
confined in application to be potentially patentable.1 64 This approach
was based on the fear that software patents would preempt too much
future research because they were abstract ideas. 165 The Supreme
Court only allowed software patents in Diehr, and only then when
Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011) (describing the
history of software's questionable patentability up to Bilski).
158. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
159. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
("[Flor the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of the claim, it must
play a signficiant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly ...."); see
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (finding a computer system in conjunction with a
rubber-curing press patent eligible).
160. E.g., Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidance Software, Inc., No. 2011-1486, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18446, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2013); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ('The equivalence of the asserted
method and system claims is also readily apparent."); CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. (CLS
Bank 1), 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 255 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Lastly, the three program claims in the [patent
in suit] are also directed to the same abstract concept despite the fact they nominally recite a
different category of invention under § 101 ...."), rev'd, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
161. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-
transformation test without replacing it).
162. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
163. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
164. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594-95 (1978); Benson, 409 U.S. at 69-70.
165. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
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computers were incorporated into other machines. 166 The second
approach originates in the State Street Bank decision. 167 In that case,
the Federal Circuit concluded that inventions were patentable if they
resulted in a "useful, concrete, and tangible result."168  State Street
Bank allowed for much broader software inventions and did not
require such a strong link between a machine and its software. 169
Out of a concern that the State Street Bank regime permitted
inventors to obtain too many patents on software and
business-method patents, the Federal Circuit returned to the
Benson-Flook-Diehr preemption approach in In re Bilski by
formulating the machine-or-transformation test and rejecting the
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" test.1 70  This line reflects the
current state of software-patent jurisprudence. 171  Even though the
Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the
sole test for patentable subject matter, the Court endorsed the Federal
Circuit's preemption approach, discussed below. 1
72
As this discussion illustrates, the foundations of
software-patent eligibility rest on shifting ground. 173 Benson and its
progeny draw heavily from O'Reilly v. Morse, an 1861 case involving
Samuel Morse, the inventor of the telegraph.1 74 Benson, Flook, Diehr,
Bilski, and Mayo all cite Morse as the genesis of the preemption view
of patentable subject matter.175 In that case, Samuel Morse attempted
to obtain a patent on "the use of the motive power of the electric or
galvanic current.., however developed for marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new
166. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93
167. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
168. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
169. See id.
170. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2009).
171. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298
(2012) (expressing concern that the claims would preempt a natural law, and thus are
unpatentable).
172. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2009).
173. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972); supra notes 151-61 and
accompanying text.
174. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853); infra notes 176-81 and
accompanying text.
175. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2009);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 204 n.22 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978);
Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
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application of that power. .". "176 In rejecting the claim, the court
reasoned:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result
is accomplished. For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward
march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of
the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set
forth in the plaintiffs specification. 
17 7
In essence, the Court reasoned that if Morse obtains a patent
on the challenged claim, it would "preempt" all other forms of
electronic communication. 7 8 The Court, however, rejected the claim
because it was not enabled, and not because it was patent ineligible. 1
79
In theory, if Morse's disclosure would have enabled a PHOSITA to
implement every possible means of electronically "marking or
printing" messages at a distance, the patent would have enabled the
claim, and the court should have upheld the patent. 80 In summary,
disclosing one method of electronic communications does not enable a
patent that can preempt the underlying idea of electronic
communication.'
8 '
Seeing this connection, some have argued that patent eligibility
should be of no concern to the courts at all, but that the other
substantive requirements are adequate to disqualify overly
preemptive patents.18 2 While such an extreme position is certainly too
heavy-handed, the link drawn between enablement and patentable
subject matter is a crucial one.18 3 Patentable subject matter serves a
valuable role as a last firewall defending the patent system from
overly broad, innovation-hindering patent claims when enablement
and the other requirements of patentability have failed to do so.' 8 4 In
fact, the Federal Circuit's citations to Morse support this
understanding: the court cites the same passage from Morse to
176. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
177. Id. at 113.
178. See id.
179. See id. ("In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he
has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he
obtained his patent.").
180. See id. at 112.
181. See id. at 113.
182. See generally Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008)
(arguing that courts should allow patents on anything that meets the other conditions of
patentability under §§ 102, 103, and 112).
183. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Cohen & Lemley, supra note 66 (discussing how patentable subject
matter constrains claim scope).
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support both the preemption foundation of patent eligibility and the
concept of commensurability.
18 5
II. CLS BANK V. ALICE CORP.
The controversy over patentable subject matter continues,
however, as demonstrated in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.186 CLS Bank
addressed a validity challenge to a patent on a computerized
stock-trading platform for use by mutual funds.18 7 The plaintiff was
an Australian company that held four US patents on an automated
method for settling large trades in international-currency markets. 18
The defendant was an international currency-trading platform
operating in foreign-exchange markets to mitigate settlement risks
between its customers and members.18 9 Those members included the
central banks of seventeen nations and seventy-two worldwide
banking institutions. 190
The first opinion in the case was a split decision. 191 The CLS
Bank I majority attempted to minimize the importance of the § 101
analysis by permitting the invalidation of patents if they covered
clearly unpatentable subject matter, giving trial courts discretion to
invalidate patents on other grounds, rather than solely treating § 101
as a threshold.192  The CLS Bank I dissent applied § 101 by
considering natural phenomena to be within the prior art, and then
performing a brief non-obviousness analysis in light of the
phenomena.
193
185. E.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1359 (2010) (citing to
Morse as support for the enablement and written description requirements of § 112); Carnegie
Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1121-22 (2008) ("It has long been the
case that a patentee 'can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if he
claims more his patent is void."') (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1853)).
186. CLS Bank II, 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
187. See id.
188. See CLS Bank 1, 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223-24 (D.D.C. 2011), rev'd, 685 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2012); U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 (filed June 27, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720 (filed
Dec. 31, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 (filed May 9, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed
May 28, 1993).
189. See CLS Bank I, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
190. See CURRENCIES, CLS GROUP HOLDINGS AG, http://www.cls-group.com/
About/Pages/Currencies.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013); SHAREHOLDERS OF CLS GROUP
HOLDINGS AG, CLS GROUP HOLDINGS AG (August 20, 2013), http://www.cls-group.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/CLS%20Group%20Shareholders%2OLegal%20Names.pdf.
191. See CLS Bank II, 685 F.3d 1341, 1341 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
192. See id. at 1347-52.
193. See id. at 1356-59.
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In light of the need for further guidance, and in the hope of
arriving at a unified standard in this area, the Federal Circuit agreed
to rehear the CLS Bank I case en banc. 194 Measured against those
goals, the CLS Bank H opinions are unfortunately a complete
failure. 195 An equally divided Federal Circuit upheld the trial court's
decision in a mere fifty-eight-word per curiam decision. 196  What
followed in over one hundred pages were five separate opinions plus
an "Additional Reflection" filed by Chief Judge Rader. 197 Those pages
present multiple approaches to determining if an invention is patent
eligible under § 101.198 Among the opinions, two general approaches
to the patentable subject matter inquiry emerged: one from the
primary concurrence, written by Judge Lourie, and one from the
primary dissent, authored by Chief Judge Rader. 199  The main
distinction on which the varying opinions focused was whether
system, method, and "computer implemented" claims all rise and fall
together.200 The primary concurrence reasoned that they did, and
thus were all invalid.201 The primary dissent argued that computer-
implemented claims contained sufficient additional limitations to be
patent eligible, specifically because those limitations tied the claims to
a machine, satisfying the machine-or-transformation test.2
0 2
A. Lourie's Concurrence-Coextensivity
Judge Lourie's concurrence was the primary opinion
supporting the trial court's decision that the claims in CLS Bank were
not patent eligible. 203 The opinion returns the § 101 analysis to its
preemption roots, essentially asking if there is a "practical likelihood
194. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. See id. at 1273.
197. See generally id. at 1269.
198. See id. at 1282-84 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1297-1302 (Rader, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1314-17 (Moore, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 1321-22 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. See id. at 1273 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
200. See id. at 1269 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1321 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. See id. at 1291 (Lourie, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 1306-11 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. See id. at 1274 (Lourie, J., concurring).
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of a claim preempting a fundamental concept. '20 4  To apply this
concept, the court begins by asking whether the claim would possibly
preempt some abstract idea.20 5 If the reviewing court uncovers such
an abstract idea, it analyzes the claim to determine whether, once the
abstract idea is removed from the claim, it contains any other
limitations that would keep the claim from "cover[ing] the full abstract
idea itself."2 6  In essence, the court determines the scope of the
abstract idea and then compares the claim to that scope to determine
if they are the same. 20 7 If both the idea and the claim are coextensive,
the claim is invalid.208 Assuming meaningful limitations do exist,
those limitations constitute the "inventive concept" that renders the
claim patent eligible.
209
A limitation only distinguishes a patent-eligible claim from an
abstract idea if the limitation is meaningful, which the opinion defines
as something that is not "merely tangential, routine, well-understood,
or conventional, or in practice fails to narrow the claim relative to the
fundamental principle therein."210  The most obvious examples of
meaningless limitations are the claims rejected by the Supreme Court
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.211 In that
case, the claims recited steps of "administering" a drug, and
"determining" the level of a particular metabolite. 212 What rendered
these limitations meaningless was that they were "necessary to every
practical use" of the natural law underlying the claim.21 3 In other
words, the scope of the claim and the scope of the underlying natural
law were effectively the same. 214
Applying these rules, the primary concurrence would hold the
claims to be patent ineligible. 21 5 As to the method claims, which recite
no machine or system, the court reasoned that the mere concept of the
trading platform could not be patented because it is "untethered from
204. Id. at 1277, 1280-81 (Lourie, J., concurring) ("First and foremost is an abiding
concern that patents should not be allowed to preempt the fundamental tools of discovery .
(citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))).
205. See id. at 1282.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1282-83.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 1283.
211. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 (2012).
212. See id. at 1295; see also CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1277, 1280-81 (citing Mayo, 132
S. Ct. at 1289, 1294-98).
213. See id. at 1283 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1292.
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any real-world application."216 As to the claims that appear to recite
computers, or require computer implementation, the court ruled that
the claims were patent ineligible because there was "no specific or
limiting recitation of essential,... or improved computer technology"
and that the limitations were indistinguishable from the limitations in
Mayo.217  Interestingly, the mere computer implementation of a
method in such a way that the computer lends "speed or efficacy" to
the method does not qualify it for patent protection. 218 This creates a
conundrum in which some computer-implemented inventions that




Chief Judge Rader's dissent did not dispute the
patent ineligibility of the system or method claims but fundamentally
disagreed with the concurrence regarding whether the
computer-implemented claims were patent ineligible. 220 Drawing from
In re Alappat, the dissent recognized that "a computer without
software collects dust, not data," and thus the combination of a
general-purpose computer with software creates a new, patent-eligible
machine.221  Further, it recognized that Bilski rejected the
machine-or-transformation test as too restrictive. 222 Bilski did not
imply that inventions that satisfy that test are of questionable
patentability, but instead that inventions that fail it may yet be
patentable.22 3  Thus, it would be odd to invalidate a
computer-implemented claim that can only be embodied in a physical,
tangible machine. 224 Further, the dissent recognized the driving
tension in patent law's discomfort with software patents-that any
method implemented in software could be implemented in clearly
patentable hardware. 225
216. Id. at 1286.
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. Id. ("Unless the claims require a computer to perform operations that are not
merely accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent eligibility.").
219. See id.






225. See id. at 1306; see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Newman, J., concurring) (discussing hardware/software equivalence), abrogated by In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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The dissent also took issue with the concurrence's
characterization of some limitations as meaningless. 226 It argued that
any claim can be simplified down to an abstract idea, and thus such
an approach could invalidate scores of patents. 227 Simply put, "a court
cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable,
tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims. ' 28
When it comes to computer-implemented inventions, the standard
should be far simpler: "[W]here the claim is tied to a computer in such
a way that the computer plays a meaningful role" in the performance
of the invention, it should be patent eligible. 229
Applying that standard to the patents in suit, the dissent
concluded that wherever the claim required a computer, the claim
recited patent-eligible subject matter.230 Further, where flowcharts
accompanied the computer implementation described in the
specification to the method, as here, labeling the claim an "abstract
concept" effectively "wrenches all meaning from those words."231 As to
the method claims, which did not recite a computer and encompass
the method of currency trading no matter the application, the dissent
agreed that they were not patent eligible. 232
III. NEEDED REFORMS AT THE USPTO AND IN THE COURTS
The continued divisions among the judges of the Federal
Circuit show that the patent system is in need of reform.233 The
central aim of the judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter is
generally to prevent the preclusion of wide areas of technological
investigation from future research.23 4 Rather than treat the doctrine
as an aberrant extension of the enablement doctrine, the better
approach is to view current patentable subject matter doctrine as a
backstop for catching excessively preclusive claims. 235 As pioneers
created entirely new fields of invention, courts usually did not stand in
226. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1309 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1298.
229. Id. at 1302.
230. See id. at 1305 ("If tying a method to a machine can be an important indication of
patent eligibility, it would seem that a claim embodying the machine itself, with all its structural
and functional limitations, would rarely, if ever, be an abstract idea." (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981))).
231. Id. at 1309.
232. See id. at 1312-13.
233. Id.
234. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).
235. See supra notes 178-81.
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the way, but instead recognized innovations in those fields as
patentable. 236 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, for example, the Supreme
Court did not hesitate to extend patent protection to an invented,
non-naturally-occurring microorganism. 237 In fact, it has now become
standard practice in the courts to follow the recitation of § 101 with
the well-known quotation that Congress intended § 101 to cover
"anything under the sun made by man."238
Considering the entire story of software, the Federal
Circuit's about-face in Bilski is likely a reaction to the excesses of the
State Street Bank regime.239  Flooded with low-quality patents
with exceedingly large scope, the courts likely adopted the
machine-or-transformation test as a limiting principle to stem the
tide. 240 But rather than continue to use § 101 as a crude tool against
software patents, the USPTO and the courts should undertake
reforms to better enforce the other substantive requirements of
patentability. 241 In this way, the USPTO and the courts should be
able to limit the sort of broad, abstract claims in State Street Bank,
Bilski, and CLS Bank, while providing patent practitioners with
clearer guidance and the software community with a new wealth of
technical documentation.
242
A. A Return to State Street Bank
Reform will likely have to begin in the courts. Specifically, the
Supreme Court should return the § 101 analysis to the State Street
Bank formulation. 243  A computer-software patent should be
patentable if it produces "a useful, concrete, and tangible result,"
which includes the transformation of data.244 This recognizes that
patentable subject matter excludes abstract ideas not because they are
236. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
237. See id.
238. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303-04
(2012) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
239. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2009).
240. See id.
241. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Section 101 is not the appropriate vehicle for
determining whether a particular technical advance is patentable ... .
242. See infra notes 279-288 and accompanying text.
243. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1285; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
affld sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2009); State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
244. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1302 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959 (quoting State Street Bank, 33 F.3d at 1373); State Street
Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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mental, mathematical, or algorithmic, but because they are not
useful.245  In fact, the abstract-idea exception should be more
doctrinally linked to the utility requirement under § 101 than the
current "preemption" approach.246 Utility is a concept rooted in the
very foundations of our patent law, specifically in the basic quid pro
quo it embodies: in exchange for a monopoly grant to the inventor, the
public receives an enabling disclosure of a useful invention.247 As the
Supreme Court put it:
Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit
exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
2 4 8
Instead of engaging in the murky metaphysical question of
whether an invention is an abstract idea, courts should engage in a
more basic analysis of whether the invention is the kind that should
merit "the public embarrassment of a patent. ' 249 The USPTO thus
should only grants patent for which there is a "specific and
substantial" utility.250 In other words, the invention, as claimed, must
provide some "immediate benefit to the public. '251 This link makes
sense because the utility requirement and the prohibition on abstract
ideas rest on the same doctrinal foundation.252 Despite the benefit a
patent may bring to the public by disclosing the invention for further
research, granting a patent would block areas of scientific pursuit
without compensating the public for that monopoly.253 Further, the
utility analysis asks the patentability question far more directly: What
benefit does the public secure in exchange for granting this patent?
254
245. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (holding an invention patentable if it
produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result").
246. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
247. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
248. Id.
249. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H. Washington ed., 1857).
250. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MPEP § 2107 II.B (8th ed.
Rev. 9, Oct. 2012).
251. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A.
1980)).
252. Compare id. at 1375-76 (explaining that, if a patent were to be granted on an
invention that was not useful, the patent may serve to "block off whole areas of scientific
development" (quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966))), with O'Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1861) (reasoning that if the claim were to be allowed on an abstract
idea, it would preclude future inventors from practicing their inventions).
253. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375-76.
254. Id. at 1371.
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B. Reconsidering the Order of Validity Challenges
Additionally, the Federal Circuit should change the procedural
requirements for considering patentable subject matter challenges. 25
5
Because the courts have considered patentable subject matter a
threshold issue, lower courts generally address it before construing
the claim language.256 It is curious that in the Bancorp decision the
Federal Circuit did not fault the district court for deciding the § 101
question prior to claim construction but nonetheless felt it necessary
to construe the claim itself before proceeding with a § 101 analysis. 257
This reflects the dichotomy the Federal Circuit perceives between
patent eligibility and invalidity.258 Problems under §§ 102, 103, and
112 are all "conditions of patentability" that courts must therefore
consider after claim construction. 259  Some commentators have
suggested that § 101 should not be considered in litigation at all.260
The Federal Circuit should minimize this confusion by expressly
permitting trial courts to consider §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 issues
together.26 1 A patent that fails to satisfy any one of those sections is
invalid.26 2 Courts could have disposed of many of the patentable
255. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en bane) (disussing whether §
101 challenges are a "threshold test").
256. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
("This court has never set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to construe claims
before determining subject matter eligibility."), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (mem.).
257. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1273-75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (endorsing the district court's decision to dispose of the case on §
101 grounds prior to construing the claims, and subsequently construing the claims on appeal).
258. See id.
259. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
260. This view is rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 282, which enumerates the defenses against
validity as including failure to comply with § 112, or "on any ground specified in part II as a
condition for patentability." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). Curiously, §§ 102 and 103 are entitled
"Conditions for Patentability; novelty" and "Conditions for Patentability; non-obvious
subjectmatter" respectively. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012). Section 101, however, is missing the
"Conditions for Patentability" prefix, leading to speculation that it was never intended to be a
defense at all. 35 U.S.C. § 101. In fact, all patentable subject matter cases prior to State Street
Bank were in the prosecution context. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Only
State Street Bank and Mayo raised patentable subject matter in the litigation context, and
neither have addressed this issue. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (1998),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
261. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Lourie, J.,
concurring) ("In addition, district courts may exercise their discretion to begin elsewhere when
they perceive that another section of the Patent Act might provide a clearer and more
expeditious path to resolving a dispute." (citing MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp. 672 F.3d 1250,
1258-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski
by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010))).
262. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
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subject matter cases on other grounds, avoiding the confusing and
unnecessary § 101 issues. 263 In fact, the CLS Bank decision makes
clear that courts may consider other grounds for invalidating patents
prior to determining patent-eligibility issues.26 4 The Federal Circuit
should go further and establish that option as the norm.
26 5
C. Deference to Trial Court PHOSITA Determinations
Likewise, the Federal Circuit must expressly delegate
responsibility for determining the relevant level of skill of the
PHOSITA to the trial court. 266 This will require overturning, to some
degree, the current Markman-Cybor regime.267  Though
Markman-Cybor considers claim construction to be like interpreting a
contract, unlike contract law, neither what the inventor intended nor
its objective textual meaning determines the legal interpretation of a
claim.26 8 The proper construction of a claim is the meaning it would
have to a PHOSITA at the time of the invention. 269 As noted above,
the Federal Circuit's precedents that consider the software PHOSITA
to have an extraordinary level of skill are unrealistic and undermine
the goals of the patent system. 270 Claim construction may remain an
issue of law for the courts to determine, but the relevant level of skill
of the PHOSITA should be a question of fact, subject to Federal
Circuit review only for an abuse of discretion. 271 Markman may
remain undisturbed, but the court should revisit Cybor and overrule
it.272
The Federal Circuit may, in fact, be moving in this direction. 73
Critically, the outcome of Lighting Ballast Control depends on a
PHOSITA's interpretation of claim language, as determined by facts
presented to the trial court. 274 Thus, the Federal Circuit should
263. See Risch, supra note 182, at 609-13.
264. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1284.
265. See id. at 1284 (Lourie, J., concurring).
266. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014,
2014 WL 667499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc) (affirming the Markman-Cybor
regime).
267. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding "the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court"); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
268. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
269. See id.
270. See supra Part I.B.2.
271. Cf. Lighting Ballast, 2014 WL 667499, at *1 (affirming Markman-Cybor).
272. See id.
273. Id. at 992.
274. See id. at 988.
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overrule Cybor, affording the trial court deference specifically with
respect to the issue of the understanding and level of skill of a
PHOSITA. 275 The Federal Circuit has already given the district courts
substantial guidance on how to determine that skill level. 276 As in
Lighting Ballast Control, many of these questions are intensely
factual in nature, placing the trial court in a better position to assess
these complex issues. 277 If nothing else, such an approach allows the
PHOSITA concept to be more flexible over time, adapting to the
complexity of the software patent at issue.
278
D. Reforms at the USPTO
Once the courts settle these issues, the USPTO should
implement complementary reforms.279  After reconciling the
examination rules with the new rules above, the USPTO should have
more flexibility to enforce enablement and best mode requirements in
prosecution. 280 As software patents are subject to more stringent
disclosure requirements, the technical information contained in
them should steadily improve with enhanced oversight.28 ' Since
patents and published patent applications are the most common
sources of prior art in other contexts, this should produce a positive
feedback loop as software patents are examined for novelty and
non-obviousness in light of more detailed prior art patents.28 2
Further, when those patents are better examined, applying the
State Street Bank rule to recent software cases would likely result in
the same outcomes, but on different grounds. 28 3 For instance, the
patented method in Bilski involved patenting the concept of hedging
risk as applied to computers. 28 4 Rather than rejecting the patent as
directed towards an abstract idea, the court just as easily could have
275. Cf. Lighting Ballast, 2014 WL 667499, at *1 (affirming Markman-Cybor)
276. See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (2007).
277. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
278. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
280. The USPTO has a long history of adapting examination rules swiftly in light of
changing precedent. See, e.g., Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm'r for
Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps (July 3,
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patentslaw/exam/2012_interim-guidance.pdf (providing
guidance after the Mayo case).
281. Specifically, the current requirements should include more than just the currently
required block diagrams. See MPEP § 2164.06(c) (8th ed. Rev. 9, Oct. 2012).
282. See id. § 904.02 (discussing common search areas for patent examiners); supra notes
69-72 and accompanying text.
283. See Risch, supra note 167, at 609-13.
284. See CLS Bank II, 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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rejected it on grounds that applying the old idea of hedging risk to
computers was a perfectly obvious combination, and thus not
patentable under § 103.285 The court even noted that the hedging
process described in the patent was "a fundamental economic practice
long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any
introductory finance class," and thus could easily have formed the
basis of a § 103 rejection. 28 6 On the other hand, had Edsger Dijsktra
submitted a patent application on his now-famous route-finding
algorithm, as used to route cars across cities or information around
the Internet such a claim would not be barred under a
machine-or-transformation test.28 7 Instead, in light of its tremendous
usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness, a patent would have issued,
protecting Dijsktra's interests and making truly useful information
about the algorithm made available to the public.
288
TV. CONCLUSION
Since the inception of the software patent, courts have created
an environment in which overly broad, poorly disclosed software
patents receive insufficient scrutiny. This leads to software patents
that do not serve the fundamental goals of US patent law. The
confusion over patentable subject matter is a symptom, not the
disease. That problem goes deeper-to the nature of the software
industry and the courts' caricatures of the average programmer's skill.
The combination of broad grants at the USPTO and subsequent
invalidations in litigation have not significantly slowed the production
of software innovation but have served to silo that information within
the firms that are innovating.
Patent law is a strong policy tool for encouraging disclosure for
the "promot[ion] ... of ... useful [a]rts."2 9  By returning to the
utilitarian patent-eligibility test of State Street Bank, courts can
resolve the confusion over what is, and is not, an abstract idea. By
making the determination of the level of skill of a PHOSITA for
claim-construction purposes a question of fact, the court can de-calcify
the view of programmers as persons of astonishing ability. This, in
turn, would reinvigorate the enablement and best-mode requirements
of patentability, resulting in more-thorough disclosure and narrower
patent claims. Following this blueprint will allow software to take its
285. See id.
286. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, CA., dissenting)); see CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1286.
287. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
place among the other innovative industries and prevent it from
causing perennial legal controversies. 290  Further, those software
patents can provide a treasure trove of useful technical data to future
software innovators.
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290. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling current remedial efforts a "failure").
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